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INTRODUCTION: FROM 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY TO MENTAL 
STRUCTURE
Focal brain lesions, that is, pathological events such 
as ischemic attack, tumors, and even infective diseases 
that affect relatively small parts of the cerebral cortex, 
can cause substantial but circumscribed impairments of 
either primary or cognitive nervous function, or both. 
The observed alterations depend on the areas and the 
cerebral circuits involved. If the lesion affects the pri-
mary motor areas, which are located in the frontal lobes 
of both hemispheres, and in particular in Brodmann area 
(BA) 4, and the axons that go from this cortical area to the 
spinal motoneurons, a paresis contralateral (most of the 
sensorimotor pathways are crossed) to the brain damage 
will be observed. Similarly, damage to primary sensory 
areas and pathways would cause contralateral sensory 
disturbances (e.g. anesthesia of contralateral limbs 
when sensory parietal cortices are damaged or blind-
ness of one visual hemifield from damage to the primary 
visual areas in the occipital lobes). When the damage is 
localized outside primary motor and sensory cortices, 
complex cognitive deficits may be observed, involving 
what are called higher brain functions. In these latter 
cases the observed disorders may range from impair-
ments of the cognitive analysis of input stimuli to 
impairments of the motor programming and selection of 
output signal (therefore, aspects that, although related 
to perception and movements, cannot be ascribed to the 
simple deficit in stimulus analysis or to the strength defi-
cit related to the paralysis) or may involve functions such 
as language, memory, decisional processes, or domain-
specific disturbance of conscious awareness (see below).
The discipline that studies the relationship between 
brain damage and higher cognitive functions is called 
neuropsychology. While its clinical goal is the descrip-
tion, diagnosis, and treatment of the disorders conse-
quent upon the brain damage, the main experimental 
aim, as widely discussed in the seminal book by Tim 
Shallice, From Neuropsychology to Mental Structure,1 is to 
draw inferences from the pathological conditions to nor-
mal functions, on the assumption that if the lesion to a 
particular brain area has provoked a specific deficit then 
that part of the brain is involved, underpins, or is neces-
sary to sustain the normal function. Scientific neuropsy-
chology dates back to the second half of the nineteenth 
century, when the observation that there was a strict 
relation between focal brain damage and disturbances 
of higher mental functions became a matter of debate 
among neurologists, who started to systematically 
study and report single cases of patients with domain-
specific cognitive impairment to unveil the neural bases 
of cognition. The observation that cognitive impair-
ment could derive from specific brain damage gave 
rise to many studies that not only described the relation 
between the symptoms and the lesion but also proposed 
real “models” for the altered function. Indeed, Broca in 
18612 not only suggested a relationship between the 
presence of a brain lesion and a language problem, but 
indicated in the third frontal circonvolution the exact 
locus of linguistic functions, therefore establishing a 
precise anatomoclinical correlation.
The first neuropsychologists, on the bases of their 
observations, proposed simple models of cerebral func-
tions in the form of diagrams in which gray matter struc-
tures, underlying higher cognitive functions, and white 
matter pathways, connecting different centers, were 
represented. These models could explain the disorders 
already observed and also tried to predict new syndromes 
on the basis of the acquired knowledge. The great merit 
of the “diagrammists” was that they realized that brain 
injuries can elucidate the organization of the cognitive 
systems. Although observations similar to those reported 
by Broca had been made previously, the scientific commu-
nity was not ready to accept them. The scientific discov-
eries in neurology and neurophysiology, which identified 
in specific brain areas specialized regions for the control 
of sensorimotor functions, also created the cultural condi-
tions for considering a cause–effect relationship between 
injury and impaired function plausible for cognitive dis-
orders, thus initiating a localization–association approach 
for the study of higher brain functions. Although the 
acceptance of the relationship between brain injury and 
altered behavior paved the way for the study of the neu-
robiological bases of cognitive functions, these models 
had some limitations, mainly related to the lack of solid 
psychological theories, the idiosyncratic choice of the 
patients to be studied, and the lack of methodological con-
straints and quantitative analysis. Therefore, the neuro-
psychological models were adjusted and adapted over the 
course of the twentieth century depending on the theoretical 
paradigms that were dominant in the neuroscientific and 
psychological fields.
First, the classical method used by neuropsychology, 
the study of clinical cases, underwent some changes 
owing to the modified scientific conditions. The devel-
opment of anatomical knowledge, on the one hand, and 
the need to apply a quantitative approach to the study 
of patients, which would allow a greater objectivity for 
neurological observations and a less idiosyncratic choice 
of the patients to be studied, on the other hand, imposed, 
in the second half of the twentieth century, the transition 
from the study of individual isolated cases to the study of 
groups of patients, who were selected according to strict 
criteria established a priori. For instance, patients could 
be selected on the basis of the symptom one wanted to 
study or according to the lesion site. Control groups of 
neurologically intact subjects were also considered as the 
normal reference system.
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At the same time, the study of neuropsychological 
disorders began to be standardized through the use 
of validated tests, which permitted the gathering of 
data suitable for statistical evaluation. These advances 
led to the acquisition of reproducible and fundamen-
tal knowledge on various aspects of human cognition, 
mainly related to the differences in intrahemispheric 
and interhemispheric neurofunction. In the second half 
of the twentieth century, the introduction of the cog-
nitive psychology approach and the model of human 
information processing, which proposed a multicompo-
nent structure of the cognitive system, provided a use-
ful theoretical framework for the study of the injured 
brain. Indeed, if it is plausible to assume the existence 
of functionally segregated cognitive centers, then it is 
possible that a center could be selectively damaged 
by a brain lesion, causing a very specific and isolated 
disorder of cognition. As Smith Churchland puts it: 
“So long as the brain functions normally, the inadequa-
cies of common-sense framework can be hidden from 
view, but with a damaged brain the inadequacies of 
theory are unmasked”.3
The general model of the functioning of the cognitive 
system was not very different from the diagrammists’ 
models insofar as different brain centers were supposed 
to give rise to separated and anatomically segregated 
cognitive functions, connected by interhemispheric and 
intrahemispheric pathways, and the single case method 
was again considered the ideal way to unveil the struc-
ture of the cognitive system. However, in the mod-
ern version of the classical associations, clinical cases 
are evaluated with both sophisticated methodological 
and statistical criteria and detailed in vivo neuroana-
tomical investigations. It is worth noting that studies in 
patients with brain lesions, obtained with the methods 
of the modern neuropsychological research, have often 
disclosed the limits of the anatomoclinical inferences 
related to the idea that brain function is localized in a 
single area of cortical tissue. Often similar disorders 
can be observed in the presence of damage in different 
brain structures, which suggests that a given function 
is not localized in one single area of the brain, but that 
the damaged region is part of a circuit or system con-
stituted by several cortical–subcortical centers. The idea 
that a function is distributed in the brain does not mean 
that all brain areas participate equally in that function, 
but that the function depends on the cooperation of spe-
cific, but different, parts of the brain. Therefore, although 
adjusted by the newly acquired knowledge on cerebral 
organization, the principle that focal damage to the brain 
can cause circumscribed and specific impairment of cog-
nitive function still holds.
Lesion studies have significantly contributed to the 
definition and clarification of the cognitive prerogative 
of the human mind, falsifying the ultracognitive view 
that mental operations, made ​possible by our informa-
tion processing systems, do not depend on the struc-
tural characteristics and organization of the biological 
substrate with which we are endowed.
LANGUAGE DISORDERS
As already mentioned, the birth of modern neuropsy-
chology is usually identified as Paul Broca’s presenta-
tion at the Société Anatomique, in 1861, of his study on 
the anatomical localization of the articulated language 
in the inferior frontal gyrus.2 In Broca’s pioneering find-
ings, the tight link between cognitive functions and 
neuroanatomical structures became evident: if a specific 
structure (the “Broca area”) is damaged, a specific func-
tion (speech production) is lost. This section will focus 
on the neuropsychological study of language deficits, 
from the “classical” aphasias to a more complex model 
of the linguistic functions inside the human brain. A new 
research field, aiming to explain “normal” linguistic pro-
cessing within the theoretical context of the embodied 
semantic, is also investigated.
Aphasia: Definition and Treatments
Aphasia is a disturbance of the production and/or the 
comprehension of language caused by selective damage 
in specific brain areas, usually located in the left hemi-
sphere (which is dominant for language in both right-
handed and left-handed people). In aphasia, multiple 
aspects of language can be compromised, including 
the syntax (the grammatical structure of sentences), the 
lexicon (the collection of words that denote meanings), 
and the morphology (the combination of phonemes, 
single speech sounds, into morphemes, the smallest 
meaningful units of a word). There are different pro-
files of aphasia, depending on which of these linguis-
tic aspects is most compromised in a specific patient. 
Most cases of aphasia are caused by trauma or stroke, 
cerebral tumors, or degenerative dementias. The cor-
rect diagnosis and effective treatment of aphasia have a 
great clinical importance because this deficit has a dev-
astating impact on the patient’s quality of life. Clinical 
interventions for aphasia aim to activate dysfunctional 
brain networks supporting linguistic processing and 
communicative intent. These interventions generally 
fall into three broad categories: speech–language reha-
bilitation treatments; pharmaceutical treatments; and 
direct brain-stimulation therapies, such as transcranial 
magnetic stimulation and transcranial direct current 
stimulation. After a brain injury there is a spontaneous 
recovery period, but there is converging evidence that 
language recovery may be enhanced by a program of 
rehabilitation therapy.
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Classical Aphasia
Historically, on the basis of both clinical and post-
mortem anatomical observations, language has been 
localized in two major brain areas: Broca anterior fron-
tal area (Brodmann area, BA 44) for speech production 
and Wernicke posterior temporal area (BA 22) for speech 
comprehension. The first functional model of language, 
proposed by Lichtheim in 1885,4 was an attempt to 
explain linguistic processing within this left temporo-
frontal network, giving an account of a wide range of 
known aphasic symptoms. The novelty of Lichtheim’s 
approach was to define language syndromes in terms 
of damage to the components of the model, in the same 
way as neuropsychologists nowadays do with the large 
spectrum of sensory, motor, and cognitive deficits affect-
ing brain-damaged patients.
In the classical view of aphasia the following syn-
dromes were described.5
Broca Aphasia
There are two variants of Broca aphasia. In classical 
Broca aphasia, lesions actually involve not only Broca 
area (BA 44 and 45) but also the surrounding frontal 
regions (BA 8, 9, 10, and 46) and the underlying white 
matter and basal ganglia. Patients have a dramatic loss 
of speech fluency and a specific form of agrammatism, 
characterized by the inability to organize words and 
sentences according to grammatical rules. Moreover, the 
patients’ capacity to repeat sentences is compromised, 
as well as their ability to assemble phonemes correctly 
(they often show phonemic and phonetic paraphasias). 
When lesions are restricted to the Broca area, a milder 
and more transient form is observed. Traditionally, from 
Broca’s original description,2 Broca aphasia is considered 
a deficit of speech production, but some of the difficul-
ties noted in language production have also been found 
to occur in language comprehension, in particular when 
the grammatical structure is complex as, for instance, in 
passive sentences.
Wernicke Aphasia
Wernicke aphasia is caused by damage to the poste-
rior sector of the left auditory association cortex (BA 22), 
often involving other surrounding areas (BA 37, 39, and 
40) and the underlying white matter. In patients with 
Wernicke aphasia, speech is fluent (effortless, melodic, 
and produced at normal rates) but the content is often 
unintelligible because of frequent errors in phoneme and 
word choice (patients often show phonemic and seman-
tic paraphasias and neologisms). Patients with Wernicke 
aphasia have difficulties in comprehending sentences 
uttered by other people, showing a deficit at a seman-
tic–lexical level. The deficit of comprehension can be 
extended to the written language.
Conduction Aphasia
Conduction aphasia shares with Broca and Wernicke 
aphasias the inability to repeat sentences, a defective 
assembly of phonemes, and an impaired naming abil-
ity, but it differs from them in the relatively preserved 
speech production and auditory comprehension. In clas-
sical descriptions (Wernicke’s model6 and Lichtheim’s 
model4), conduction aphasia was uniquely ascribed to 
lesions of the arcuate fasciculus, a white matter path-
way connecting the Wernicke and Broca areas. It is now 
known that, although the subcortical projections link-
ing temporal, parietal, and frontal cortices are often 
damaged in patients affected by this kind of language 
problem there is no evidence that a pure white matter 
disconnection can cause conduction aphasia. In addition, 
the involvement of the left inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), 
the left primary auditory cortices (BA 41 and 42), and the 
insula seems to be necessary to cause the symptoms.
Global Aphasia
Patients with global aphasia have almost completely 
lost the ability to comprehend language and formulate 
speech, combining the features of both Broca and Wer-
nicke aphasia. Global aphasia is usually caused by large 
anteroposterior damage, widely involving the language 
regions, the basal ganglia region, and the insula.
Transcortical Aphasias
These types of aphasia can be distinguished from all 
others by the fact that the ability to repeat sentences is 
normal. The motor variant usually occurs after left fron-
tal lesions above and in front of the Broca area. The sen-
sory variant is caused by lesions in temporal or parietal 
cortices, in the vicinity of the Wernicke area.
Anomic Aphasia
Damage to the left anterior temporal cortices (BA 20, 
21, and 38) severely impairs the ability to retrieve words, 
but is not accompanied by any grammatical, phonemic, 
or phonetic difficulty, causing a “pure” naming deficit. 
More specifically, when the damage is confined to the left 
temporal pole (BA 38) patients have a deficit in the ability 
to retrieve proper nouns of places and people; when the 
lesion involves BA 20 and 21 the defect encompasses the 
ability to retrieve both proper and common nouns.
Towards a More Complex Model of Language  
in the Human Brain
Although the anatomoclinical correlations between 
the different types of aphasia symptom and the dam-
age to specific brain areas were thoroughly confirmed 
in the twentieth century by a large number of neuropsy-
chological and neurostructural studies, in recent decades 
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the complex networks underlying language have been 
explored using innovative techniques such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and diffusion ten-
sor imaging. This approach led to the development of a 
more dynamic, connectionist approach to the study of 
the anatomical correlates of aphasias. On the one hand, 
areas originally thought to be specialized for language 
have been shown to be also involved in cognitive and 
perceptual functions not directly related to language; on 
the other hand, it has been demonstrated that language 
does not exclusively rely on the Wernicke–Broca lan-
guage network.7 Furthermore, recent neuropsychologi-
cal studies on the consequences of acquired brain lesions 
in children and adults have suggested that the outcomes 
of aphasias have a greater variability than predicted by 
the classical models, depending on the patient’s age, the 
etiology, site, and size of the lesion, and the initial sever-
ity of the impairment.8 Whereas sudden brain lesions 
affecting specialized areas often result in severe aphasia, 
the clinical pattern is different in the case of slowly grow-
ing lesions such as low-grade gliomas. Slow tumor evo-
lution allows for compensatory mechanisms to develop 
through the recruitment of intrahemispheric and inter-
hemispheric neuronal networks (i.e. perilesional and/or 
contralateral homologous brain regions). As suggested 
by the case study of a “patient speaking without Broca’s 
area”,7 in which the left inferior frontal gyrus resection 
(including Broca area), due to tumor infiltration, did not 
lead to severe language impairments, the efficiency of 
brain plasticity can, in some instances, compensate for 
the anatomical specialization of linguistic functions.
Embodied Semantics
Neuropsychological research on language functions is 
not confined to the study of aphasia, but also includes the 
study of “normal” linguistic processing in healthy sub-
jects. An innovative and fecund research paradigm has 
developed, which aims to explain linguistic functions 
within the theoretical framework of embodied cogni-
tion.9,10 From this perspective, not only perceptual rep-
resentation but also high-level cognitive processes, such 
as concept formation and language, are essentially based 
on motor programs. Contrary to the classical approach 
in cognitive science, in which concepts are viewed as 
amodal and arbitrary symbols, the embodied hypothesis 
argues that concepts must be grounded on sensorimotor 
experiences to be meaningful. In line with this view, neu-
roimaging studies have shown a somatotopic pattern of 
activation along cortical motor areas for the observation 
of actions involving different body parts, as well as for 
action-related language comprehension (see Aziz Zadeh 
and Damasio11 for a review). For example, the concept of 
“grasping” would be represented in sensorimotor areas 
that code grasping actions; the concept of “kicking” would 
be represented by sensorimotor areas that control kicking 
actions; and so forth. The signals related to the common 
goal for a variety of specific actions (i.e. grasping with the 
mouth or with the hand or toes, along with related affor-
dances) would also converge on a particular group of 
neurons, thus providing a more general representation of 
“grasping”. This would be the neurobiological substrate 
of generalized conceptual representations, which, in turn, 
could be related to language description.11 This theory 
has been extended by Lakoff and colleagues to include 
metaphors. Thus, the phrase “kick off the year” would 
also involve the motor representations related to kicking, 
just as the phrase “grasp the explanation” would involve 
motor representations related to the control of the hand.12 
In a future perspective, exploring the link between these 
conceptual representations and metaphorical language 
will be especially important, as it has been proposed that 
much of abstract thinking is performed metaphorically.12
MEMORY DISORDERS: AMNESIA
Amnesia, a profound disorder of memory functions, 
is a clear example of how we can propose a hypothesis 
about the structure of a cognitive process and make 
inferences from the combination of association and 
dissociation of symptoms present in a particular kind 
of neuropsychological syndrome. Since the work of 
Hebb,13 the idea that memory is equally distributed 
throughout different brain regions, being intimately 
related to perceptual and intellectual functions,14 was 
strongly challenged by those scientists who believed 
that, although memory processes are indeed distributed 
in different cortical and subcortical structures, specific 
aspects are processed by different areas and relatively 
independently from other cognitive functions. This lat-
ter position was dramatically confirmed by the study of 
patients who, immediately after selective brain surgery 
for the treatment of intractable epilepsy, showed dra-
matic, specific, and dissociated memory impairments. 
The most enlightening observations were made by 
Brenda Milner, Susan Corkin, and their co-workers15–17 
on patient HM. This patient, after bilateral resection 
of the medial temporal lobes, was left with a complex 
syndrome characterized by severe memory impair-
ments that affected some memory capacities but not 
others, and by a considerable sparing of other cogni-
tive functions. First of all, it was noted that he had a 
severe anterograde amnesia, with which he could not 
acquire new memories, dating from the day of his 
brain damage. Moreover, he could not retrieve some 
of the memories that he acquired before surgery (ret-
rograde amnesia), although access to facts and events 
from times remote from surgery were still possible. This 
latter finding implies that medial temporal lobe 
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structures are not the final locus for storing old memo-
ries. After learning, memories that initially require the 
integrity of medial temporal lobe structures must be 
reorganized and stored somewhere else in the brain to 
become independent from these structures. According 
to many authors, once a memory has been fully consoli-
dated, its storage and reactivation may depend on pro-
cesses and structures located in neocortex.18 The extent 
of retrograde amnesia may be taken as an index of how 
long the consolidation process lasts.
Despite his severe memory problems, HM’s other 
cognitive and perceptual capacities were intact. For 
instance, his intelligence quotient (IQ) was higher after 
compared with before surgery and no main percep-
tual problems were detected. The memory disorders 
affected both verbal and non-verbal tasks, as well as 
stimuli presented in all sensory modalities. From these 
observations the inference was made that memory 
functions can be kept separated from other cognitive 
functions and from more primary perceptual and sen-
sory processes.18 It is also worth noting that the impair-
ments described above involved what are normally 
indicated as long-term memory capacities. However, 
short-term memory was intact in HM. That means that 
he could repeat a sequence of digits immediately after 
their presentation and that he could follow a conver-
sation providing that it did not become too long and 
based on data that were presented before the talk.19 
Therefore, the dissociation between long and short 
memory processes was another fundamental finding 
from the study of HM.
As already mentioned, within long-term memory pro-
cesses, anterograde amnesia refers to the impossibility 
of learning new facts and HM was severely impaired in 
this domain. However, and somehow astonishingly con-
sidering his otherwise dramatic memory impairment, 
HM showed intact capacities of acquiring new motor 
and perceptual skills20–22 (procedural memory), clearly 
demonstrating that amnesia associated with hippocam-
pal damage affects what are indicated as declarative 
memory processes (the ability to recall facts and events 
related to specific personal experience, episodic mem-
ory), leaving intact other memory operations related 
to the functioning of separated brain structures and 
systems.23 It is important to note that HM’s profound 
memory disorder resulted from brain damage that was 
not confined to the hippocampus but also involved the 
amygdala and the adjacent parahippocamapal gyrus. 
Another patient, RB, who had a lesion limited to the 
hippocampus following an ischemic attack, had a simi-
lar, but less severe memory disorder.24 Taken together, 
these results indicate that damage to the hippocampus 
is sufficient to cause a clinically significant amnesic dis-
order and that additional damage to adjacent structures 
aggravates the symptoms.
The study of HM revealed the most important aspects 
of how memory is structured and organized in the brain. 
As Squire and Wixted wrote in 2011: “These findings 
established the fundamental principle that memory is 
a distinct cerebral function, separable from other per-
ceptual and cognitive abilities, and also identified the 
medial aspect of the temporal lobe as important for 
memory. The early descriptions of HM can be said to 
have inaugurated the modern era of memory research, 
and the findings from HM enormously influenced the 
direction of subsequent work”.
It is worth remembering that there are, unfortunately, 
other pathological conditions that can induce severe amne-
sic disorders. Alcohol abuse, leading to thiamine deficit 
and to damage to diencephalic brain structures, includ-
ing the mammillary body, can be the cause of Korsakoff 
syndrome, where a severe anterograde deficit is always 
observed (for a review see Fama et al.25). Infections affect-
ing the brain, such as herpes simplex virus encephalitis, 
can cause disastrous amnesia that may extend beyond 
episodic problems and involve semantic knowledge.
DISORDERS OF MOVEMENT EXECUTION: 
APRAXIA
Apraxia has been defined as the inability to carry out 
learned, skilled motor acts despite preserved motor and 
sensory functions, coordination, and comprehension. 
The major types are described in this section.
Ideomotor Apraxia
Ideomotor apraxia (IMA) is the impaired ability to 
perform a skilled gesture with a limb upon verbal com-
mand and/or by imitation. It can be shown for both 
meaningful motor acts that do not imply objects and 
gestures that imply object use. In this latter case, patients 
may not be able to perform the pantomime (i.e. to show 
how to use an object without actually manipulating it) 
or may not be able to use the actual object. Many authors 
also consider the inability to imitate meaningless ges-
tures as apraxia. Patients with IMA show errors in the 
temporal and spatial sequencing of movements, in their 
amplitude and configuration, and in limb position in 
space.
Various dissociations have been described. For instance, 
a voluntary–automatic dichotomy has been described 
according to which patients seem to be able to perform in 
their daily life activities the same acts that they are unable 
to perform when requested by the examiner. Differences 
in the performance related to the type of gesture to be pro-
duced have also been described. For instance, there may 
be differences in the performance between actions imply-
ing use of an object (transitive actions) and actions not 
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implying use of an object (intransitive actions, e.g. waving 
goodbye). Finally, apraxia is often more severe for mean-
ingless actions than for meaningful actions, although 
the opposite dissociation has also been described. Given 
these dissociations, it is essential that the diagnosis of 
IMA include a wide variety of tasks.
Ideational Apraxia
Patients with ideational apraxia (IA) have difficul-
ties in executing a sequence of actions when perform-
ing a complex multistage task (e.g. making coffee). Some 
authors also distinguish between IA and conceptual 
apraxia, identifying with this latter condition an impair-
ment of object or action knowledge. Patients with con-
ceptual apraxia may misuse objects, can be impaired in 
matching objects with the corresponding actions, or may 
be unable to judge whether an action is correctly or ill 
formed. Patients with IA or conceptual apraxia tend to 
be seriously disabled in their everyday life. IA and IMA 
can be doubly dissociated.
Orofacial Apraxia
Orofacial apraxia is an impairment in the execution 
of skilled movements involving the face, mouth, tongue, 
larynx, and pharynx (e.g. blowing a kiss or whistling) 
when requested by the examiner. Similarly to IMA, 
automatic movements of the same muscles are often pre-
served. Orofacial and limb apraxias often coexist but can 
be dissociated.
Limb-Kinetic Apraxia
The term limb-kinetic apraxia describes inaccurate 
or clumsy distal movements of the limbs contralateral 
to the lesioned hemisphere. Limb-kinetic apraxia differs 
from classical ideomotor apraxia because it tends to be 
independent of modality (e.g. verbal command versus 
imitation) and there is typically no voluntary–automatic 
dissociation.
Constructional Apraxia
Constructional apraxia is a particular type of apraxia 
where patients are unable to spontaneously draw 
objects, copy figures and build blocks or patterns with 
sticks following damage to the left or right hemisphere. 
Hence, constructional apraxia seems to reflect the loss 
of the ability to integrate perceptual, categorical, and 
coordinate spatial relations with the motor actions nec-
essary to complete a constructive task. constructional 
apraxia can be dissociated from the other types of 
apraxia.
Anatomy of Apraxia
Interhemispheric Localization
The two major forms of apraxia (IMA and IA) are more 
frequent following left hemisphere lesions. Nevertheless, 
in a few instances apraxia has also been described after 
lesions of the right hemisphere, suggesting that right 
hemisphere structures can also support skilled move-
ments to a certain extent. Specifically, right hemisphere 
“praxic” structures can be recruited following injuries to 
the left hemisphere and also as a result of training and 
execution of highly practiced familiar actions.
Intrahemispheric Localization
IMA and IA have been associated with lesions to the 
parietal and frontal cortices of the left hemisphere, as 
well as with white matter connections between these 
areas. fMRI studies during gesture execution in healthy 
subjects have confirmed the involvement of left parietal 
and frontal regions, including the dorsolateral frontal 
and intraparietal cortex. A particular form of IMA can 
be seen after callosal lesions; in this case, it only involves 
the left hand, being the consequence of the disconnec-
tion of the right hemisphere premotor and motor areas 
from the left hemisphere praxis centers.
The basal ganglia also play an important role in praxis 
via bilateral connections with frontal and parietal areas.
Finally, it is important to consider the relationship 
between limb apraxia and aphasia. Apraxia and apha-
sia frequently coexist following left hemisphere damage, 
raising the question of whether there is a common fea-
ture underlying both disturbances (some authors point 
to an asymbolic problem) or whether linguistic dysfunc-
tion is responsible for apraxia because patients do not 
understand the examiner’s requests. However, dissocia-
tions between aphasia and apraxia have been reported, 
thereby falsifying both hypotheses. Moreover, aphasia 
cannot account for apraxia in cases of gesture imitation. 
So, rather than there being a causal relationship between 
aphasia and apraxia, these two symptoms are likely to 
be associated in the same patient owing to lesions affect-
ing adjacent neural substrates for language and gestures.
Neuropsychological Models of Apraxia
Different models to understand the neurocogni-
tive mechanisms underlying apraxic disorders have 
been proposed. Here, the most influential ones will be 
reviewed.
Liepmann’s Model
In 1920, Hugo Liepmann proposed a disconnection 
model of praxic disorders according to which the repre-
sentation of an action (space–time plan) is stored in the 
left parietal lobe.26 In order to execute the action with 
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the right hand, the space–time plan is retrieved and then 
reaches the primary motor areas through the left pre-
frontal cortex. Left-hand actions (ultimately controlled 
by the right hemisphere) are possible because the action 
plan reaches right premotor and motor areas through the 
corpus callosum. In ideomotor apraxia action represen-
tations and limb kinetics are intact, whereas frontopa-
rietal connections are disrupted, causing an inability to 
execute normal actions. Ideational apraxia would result 
from direct lesion to the action representation area and 
limb-kinetic apraxia from disruption of “kinesthetic–
innervatory engrams” in the left frontal lobe.
Geschwind’s Model
Norman Geschwind proposed a disconnection model 
of apraxia routed on Liepmann’s model, according to 
which the verbal command for the action of the right 
hand is comprehended in the Wernicke area and is trans-
ferred to the ipsilateral premotor and motor areas via the 
superior longitudinal fasciculus.27 A lesion to this path-
way would spare gesture comprehension but compro-
mise action performance elicited by verbal command. 
To explain failure of action imitation and object use, 
Geschwind proposed that visual association and premo-
tor areas are connected through the same pathways run-
ning through language and motor areas, but this notion 
remains controversial.
Heilman and Rothi’s Model
Heilman and Rothi proposed an alternative rep-
resentational model of apraxia in which left anterior 
premotor–motor regions are responsible for gesture pro-
duction and left posterior parietal regions store the rep-
resentation of learned movements and are responsible 
for gesture comprehension and discrimination.28 Lesions 
to anterior regions would cause ideomotor apraxia, and 
lesions to posterior regions ideational apraxia as well as 
difficulties in movement production. Some neuropsycho-
logical data have supported this model.
To account for modality-specific dissociations in praxic 
disorders, in subsequent versions of their model Heil-
man and Rothi proposed separate processing routes for 
auditory and visual inputs, conveying information in 
a specific “action semantic system”, dissociable from 
other semantics, which would activate an “action recep-
tion lexicon” connected with an “action production 
lexicon”.29 A separate “non-lexical route”, which bypasses 
the action semantic system, would be responsible for the 
ability to imitate novel and meaningless gestures.
Key Questions
The discovery that particular neuronal popula-
tions (mirror neurons) are active both when an action 
is produced and when an individual observes that 
same action30 poses a challenge for praxis models that 
hypothesize separate structures for action production 
and action recognition/comprehension. In particular, 
if the same representations subserve both action execu-
tion and recognition, the question arises of whether the 
perception/comprehension of a movement is con-
strained by its executional knowledge. The complexity 
of the praxis system suggests that it should be better 
studied through a multidisciplinary approach encom-
passing knowledge from lesion studies, fMRI data 
from healthy individuals, neurophysiological data from 
animal studies, and psychophysical and computational 
models of complex action execution (for reviews see 
references31–33]. This could help to reach a more detailed 
mapping of large-scale neuronal networks underlying 
praxis, the assessment of alterations in these networks 
following injury, and their relationship with behavioral 
dysfunctions. A better understanding of these issues will 
lead to the development of more efficacious therapeutic 
and rehabilitative interventions.
DISORDERS OF VISUAL RECOGNITION: 
AGNOSIA
The neuropsychological disorder known as agnosia 
refers to the impairment of stimulus recognition in one 
modality in the absence of perceptual deficits, memory 
problems, and general intellectual impairment. This dis-
order is intriguing both scientifically and clinically and 
its study has contributed to shedding light on how the 
normal visual system functions. When the impaired 
recognition relates to objects in general, the condition 
is called object agnosia; when the unrecognized visual 
stimulus is a face, it is called prosopagnosia. An over-
view of the major types of agnosia is presented here.
Object Agnosia
In object agnosia, patients do not recognize objects in 
one specific input modality (visual, tactile, or auditory), 
whereas the same objects can be promptly recognized 
when presented through a different input channel. The 
perceptual nature of the disorder is testified by the fact 
that it cannot be ascribed to the co-occurrence of sensory 
elementary deficits, memory problems, naming diffi-
culties (aphasia), and general intellectual impairment 
(patients are well aware of their predicament).
Visual Agnosia
Although it is a relatively rare neurological symptom, 
with some 100 cases published between 1890 and 1990, 
its study has greatly contributed to the understanding of 
how the process of visual recognition is organized in the 
human brain. There is no standard taxonomy of visual 
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agnosias, but most neuropsychologists agree with Lis-
sauer’s original distinction between apperceptive and 
associative types,34 depending on the lower or higher 
processing stage of visual information affected by the 
brain lesion. Because this account has continued to be 
used in the neuropsychological literature to the present 
day, it is used here as a general framework.
Apperceptive Agnosia
Apperceptive agnosia is evident when patients are 
unable to recognize objects because they cannot see them 
properly, in the absence of elementary visual deficits. It 
is thought to arise from a breakdown at relatively early 
stages of visual processing, where the elementary features 
of the stimulus are analyzed. Object recognition through 
verbal description by the examiner is, instead, preserved. 
In apperceptive agnosia, shape perception is abnormal 
in such a way that patients cannot recognize or copy pic-
tures, letters, or even simple geometric shapes. In most 
cases of apperceptive agnosia, the brain damage is diffuse, 
often caused by carbon monoxide poisoning. In the rare 
cases with circumscribed brain lesions, damage primar-
ily affected the ventral occipitotemporal cortex bilaterally.
According to a widely accepted interpretation, apper-
ceptive agnosia can be considered a deficit of shape per-
ception resulting from defective perceptual grouping of 
an object’s local features into a global percept. However, 
clinical findings show that apperceptive agnosia cov-
ers a wide spectrum of disorders, some of which fall in 
between apperceptive and associative agnosia. Hence, 
two neuropsychologists, Riddoch and Humphreys,35 
proposed to differentiate between distinct subtypes of 
apperceptive agnosia, each corresponding to a defec-
tive processing stage along the hierarchically organized 
stream of visual information processing leading to con-
scious object perception (according to Marr’s compu-
tational model of vision36). These subtypes are shape 
agnosia and integrative agnosia, which are closer to the 
apperceptive type; and transformational agnosia and 
agnosia due to impairment of internal object representa-
tion, which are closer to the associative type.35
  
	•	  Shape agnosia results from a deficit of the initial 
processing stage of visual recognition and consists 
of the inability to organize the sensory input into 
a unified percept. Patients complain of blurred 
or unclear vision and are unable to discriminate 
stimulus boundaries from the background or other 
contiguous or overlapping shapes, as well as the 
orientation and size of the input.
	•	  Integrative agnosia consists of the inability to integrate 
single object features into a global shape, in the 
presence of the ability to identify single object 
details. This deficit is more severe when the object 
shape is defined by high-frequency details or when 
overlapping figures must be identified, but is 
reduced when silhouettes of objects with reduced 
internal details are used for discrimination.
	•	  Transformational agnosia is a deficit of perceptual 
categorization (first described in 1982 by 
Warrington37), which occurs when patients can 
recognize objects presented in a canonical view, but 
fail when they are presented in non-canonical views. 
What is lost is the ability to manipulate the mental 
representation of the object and to match it with its 
perceptual image.
	•	  Agnosia due to impairment of internal representations 
of objects occurs when a structural description 
of the object is formed normally but its internal 
representation stored in presemantic memory cannot 
be accessed through a given route to match on-line 
descriptions encoded by the visual system.
Associative Agnosia
This type of agnosia occurs when patients can form 
a structural description of the visual object (object copy 
is preserved), yet are unable to recognize it. Associative 
agnosic patients cannot identify objects even by non-
verbal means (e.g. by pantomiming their use or group-
ing together dissimilar objects from the same semantic 
category); however, recognition is preserved in the tac-
tile modality (by touching the object) or from a spoken 
definition. Intrahemispheric location of the lesion is gen-
erally occipitotemporal, either unilateral (with a preva-
lence of left hemispheric lesions) or bilateral.
Associative agnosia has been explained as a deficit 
of the activation of the semantic associations related to 
the visual percept: patients, despite being able to form a 
normal visual representation of the stimulus, are unable 
to access the knowledge related to it and therefore rec-
ognition is prevented. Therefore, patients fail in seman-
tic categorization and association tasks, as well as in the 
description of the semantic attributes of an object. In visual 
naming tasks, errors tend to be semantic (e.g. “knife” for 
“fork”), sometimes with the production of the superor-
dinate (“flower” for “daisy”), although errors totally 
unrelated to the stimulus (e.g. “horse” for “chair”) can be 
observed. Miming the use of a visually presented object 
is also impaired, whereas the task is carried out correctly 
if a verbal description of the object is offered. According 
to one view, associative agnosia is the consequence of a 
disconnection between visual areas and other brain cen-
ters responsible for language or memory. This hypothe-
sis, however, does not account for the inability of agnosic 
patients to convey information non-verbally and to 
access old knowledge through vision. Another possibility 
is that semantic knowledge cannot be accessed through 
the visual modality because the lesion has damaged the 
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connection between the areas that process the stimulus 
and semantic memory (semantic access agnosia). A dif-
ferent interpretation assumes that stored visual memory 
representations have been partially or totally damaged so 
that the newly formed visual percepts cannot be matched 
against any stored knowledge and, therefore, recogni-
tion is impossible. In this case, however, the disorder 
should be observed in all modalities and, therefore, can-
not be considered a pure perceptual disorder but instead 
becomes a true disorder of semantic memory.
Tactile Agnosia
Tactile agnosia is the inability to recognize objects 
through touch, in the absence of elementary sensory def-
icits. Recognition in other modalities is preserved. The 
locus of the lesion involves the posterior–inferior por-
tion of the parietal lobe and can be unilateral or bilateral. 
The deficit has been rarely studied and the interpreta-
tions are similar to those offered for visual agnosia.
Acoustic Agnosia
Acoustic agnosia (or aphasia) is the inability to name 
an object through sound (e.g. failure to name a bunch of 
keys given the sound the keys make when shaken) with 
preserved ability to recognize objects in other sensory 
domains.
Face Agnosia (Prosopagnosia)
The term prosopagnosia refers to the inability to rec-
ognize familiar faces. The deficit is confined to the identi-
fication of physiognomic traits, as shown by the fact that 
identification is preserved through non-physiognomic 
cues, such as voice, a particular item of clothing, a scar, or 
gait. Usually patients do not recognize friends, acquain-
tances, and famous people. In the most severe cases 
patients cannot even recognize their own face in the mir-
ror. However, perceptual categorization of the stimulus is 
preserved (patients know that a face is a face) as well as 
the ability to differentiate faces by gender, race, age, and 
emotional expressions.
Psychophysical and neuropsychological studies on 
face recognition abilities in healthy and brain-damaged 
patients have revealed that familiar and unfamiliar face 
processing follows dedicated routes in the left and right 
hemisphere, respectively. This distinction led the neuro-
psychologist A.L. Benton to differentiate between two 
independent face processing deficits produced by brain 
damage: apperceptive prosopagnosia, which refers to a 
defective perceptual processing of face information and 
is brought out by unfamiliar face tasks; and associative 
prosopagnosia, which involves an additional mnestic 
component and is elicited by familiar face tasks.38
Apperceptive and Associative Prosopagnosia
According to the model of visual recognition pro-
posed by Bruce and Young, the identification of a face is 
the final stage in a sequence of operations made by dis-
tinct, hierarchically organized, information processing 
modules distributed along the occipitotemporal ventral 
pathway of the brain.39 At the earlier stages, perceptual 
face processing results in the construction of an object-
centered, tridimensional structural description of the 
face. If this processing level is damaged, patients are 
unable to recognize familiar faces and to match differ-
ent pictures of unfamiliar faces (apperceptive prosop-
agnosia). At later processing stages, the structural 
description of the face activates an abstract represen-
tation of it stored in recognition units responsible for 
the feeling of familiarity. Then, the information gains 
access to the semantic memory representation (identity 
nodes) containing the knowledge related to that partic-
ular known face. From the identity nodes, information 
finally accesses the modules containing the person’s 
name. The anatomical–functional independence of the 
names module is confirmed by the existence of anomia 
for proper names following left brain damage (a rare 
occurrence) and by the frequent inability experienced 
by non-prosopagnosic people to retrieve the name of an 
otherwise well known person (“name on the tip of the 
tongue” phenomenon).
Associative prosopagnosia is normally consequent 
upon an impairment at the level of either recogni-
tion units or identity nodes, or both: patients are able 
to match unfamiliar faces, but fail to recognize famil-
iar faces. Knowledge of the people to whom the faces 
belong can be accessed through other sensory modalities 
(e.g. sound) and is intact.
Unconscious Face Recognition
This phenomenon is based on the fact that some 
prosopagnosic patients may show, in indirect tasks, nor-
mal responses to famous faces, thus presenting with some 
degree of implicit processing of the unrecognized stimuli. 
This is particularly evident in psychophysiological and 
neurophysiological measures, such as skin conductance, 
where prosopagnosic patients may show an increase 
in electrodermal activity when presented with familiar 
faces, but not with unfamiliar faces (like healthy subjects). 
Perhaps the most convincing interpretation of this phe-
nomenon is that conscious recognition requires a higher 
activation threshold from the visual input than implicit 
recognition. According to this view, if the lesion produc-
ing prosopagnosia completely impairs the function of rec-
ognition units, both implicit and explicit recognition will 
be impossible. If the impairment is only partial, instead, 
the output from recognition units will be sufficient 
for unconscious recognition but insufficient for overt 
recognition (for reviews on agnosia see references 40–42).
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DISORDERS OF SPATIAL 
REPRESENTATION: UNILATERAL 
NEGLECT
Unilateral neglect (UN) is a neurological syndrome 
first described around the turn of the twentieth century. 
Its core symptom is the loss of conscious awareness for 
the left side of the perceptual and mental space.
Clinical Manifestations
UN patients behave “… as if they were no longer able 
to perceive and conceive the existence of the left side of 
somatic and extrasomatic space”.43 For example, in the 
acute phase after stroke, more frequently affecting the 
right hemisphere, patients often show a more or less 
complete deviation of the eyes and head towards the 
right space, fail to respond to left-side visual and audi-
tory stimulation, tend to underuse their left upper and 
lower limbs (in the absence of hemiplegia or severe 
motor impairment), do not explore the left side of their 
body or environment, and may forget to dress the left 
side of their body or to wash the left side of their face. 
UN patients are often unaware of their symptoms 
(anosognosia).
UN may be diagnosed by means of simple bedside 
paper-and-pencil tests. When asked to bisect a line seg-
ment, UN patients misbisect it to the right of the objec-
tive midpoint; when asked to cross out line segments 
printed on a sheet of paper (Albert’s test) they omit to 
cross out a number of left-side segments; in drawing or 
recalling from memory simple objects (e.g. a daisy or 
a clock face) they omit, misarrange, or distort left-side 
details (Fig. 32.1).
Neglect symptoms may also occur outside the visual 
domain, in the haptic (somatic and extrasomatic) space 
(e.g. blindfolded patients asked to touch their left hand 
or shoulder with their right hand may fail to do it, or 
asked to collect objects spread over a table may not find 
them), the auditory space (patients asked to locate sound 
sources may mislocate them to the right side of space), 
and the representational space (patients asked to form 
the mental image of a familiar view – a town square, a 
room, a map of a country – and to describe its details 
from two opposite vantage points may omit left-side 
details of the mental images).
Clinicoanatomical Correlations
UN is more frequent following lesions to the right 
hemisphere, with an incidence varying from 30 to 43% 
after right hemisphere stroke.43,44 UN may be localized 
within a hemisphere, and has been associated with both 
cortical and subcortical lesions. Brain areas whose lesion 
is most frequently associated with UN are the temporal, 
parietal, frontal, and occipital lobes, the basal ganglia, 
and the thalamus.44
Course of Unilateral Neglect
The majority of the symptoms of neglect recede more 
or less completely following the acute phase of the dis-
ease. However, depending on the severity of neglect, 
some symptoms may persist for weeks or years. The 
mechanisms sustaining the functional restoration of 
neglect symptoms are not yet fully understood and 
include plastic processes arising in surviving circuits in 
the damaged hemisphere as well as in structures of the 
undamaged hemisphere.
Interpretation of the Syndrome
Since the 1980s, several interpretations of UN have 
been proposed, which differ according to the processing 
level at which the causal mechanisms of the syndrome 
are thought to operate: the sensory, attentional, and 
representational level.
Sensory Interpretations
This group of interpretations considers the causal 
mechanisms of UN as relatively “peripheral”: contral-
esional (left) sensory information would go undetected 
owing to (1) a sort of global extinction phenomenon 
(stimuli addressed to the damaged hemisphere are 
more or less correctly perceived if presented in isola-
tion, but are suppressed if given in association with 
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FIGURE 32.1 Pencil-and-paper 
tests in unilateral neglect (UN).  
(A) Copies of daisies from a model 
(upper part of the figure) by two patients 
with UN; (B) Albert’s cancellation task: 
note that the patient has omitted to can-
cel the majority of left-side segments; (C) 
drawing from memory of a clock face, 
by a patient with UN.
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stimuli presented to the undamaged hemisphere); 
(2) impairment of eye movements towards the left space; 
or (3) impairment of orienting reflex towards left stim-
uli. These interpretations refer to impaired processing of 
stimuli external to the CNS and lost most of their valid-
ity after it was ascertained that UN can be found at the 
level of mental imagery.43
Attentional Interpretations
According to these interpretations, lesions to the right 
hemisphere impair the ability of UN patients to effica-
ciously orient attention leftwards, with the consequence 
of becoming unaware of contralesional sensory events. 
The model that is often used to interpret UN symptoms 
was proposed by Kinsbourne.45 This model posits the 
existence of two antagonist attentional vectors, each 
depending on one hemisphere and directing attention 
contralaterally. A further assumption of the model is that 
the left hemisphere vector normally predominates over 
the right hemisphere one, so that the right side of space 
is attentionally privileged even in healthy people. This 
model predicts that damage to one hemisphere would 
impair the corresponding attentional vector and there-
fore cause a pathological imbalance of attention towards 
the ipsilesional hemispace. If the left hemisphere is 
lesioned, the imbalance is less pronounced, and neglect 
unapparent, because it releases the weaker right hemi-
sphere vector; by contrast, if the right hemisphere is 
lesioned, the predominant left hemisphere vector is 
released, biasing attention more strongly rightwards 
and causing neglect for the left side of space. Accord-
ing to this model, the attentional impairment caused 
by the lesion should be distributed along the left–right 
dimension of space, with a continuous gradient rang-
ing from maximum to minimum severity in the left and 
right extremes spatial sectors, respectively. Behavioral 
and neurophysiological data confirm this prediction. In 
this respect, it is worth noting that single-neuron electro-
physiology showed that in the postarcuate cortex of the 
monkey (the lesion of which gives rise to contralateral 
neglect) 29% of neurons have exclusively contralateral, 
3% exclusively ipsilateral, and 68% bilateral receptive 
fields.46 Such a distribution of space-coding neurons 
is compatible with the gradient of the attentional bias 
along the left–right dimension of space described for 
UN patients.
Representational Interpretations
As already mentioned, UN patients asked to remem-
ber and describe a familiar view (a town square, a map 
of their country, or the layout of their home) from a defi-
nite vantage point may neglect contralesional details, in 
the absence of long-term spatial memory deficits. Such 
pioneering clinical observations, first reported by Edo-
ardo Bisiach and co-workers,47 led them to conclude that 
UN is also a deficit of the endogenous mental represen-
tation of the contralesional extent of perceptual space. 
Representational accounts of UN do not entail that atten-
tional interpretations are inadequate; they imply that the 
concept of attention should be extended to comprise “… 
the processes of generation and transformation of men-
tal representations” and “… it would therefore refer to 
the dynamics of representational processes themselves, 
rather than to separate processes”.43 Bisiach and col-
leagues48,49 updated the representational explanation 
in order to explain an apparently paradoxical behavior 
shown by some neglect patients. When asked to extend 
a segment towards the left in order to double its origi-
nal length, some patients overextend it, so as to create 
a left half-segment much longer than the right half- 
segment. This behavior cannot be accounted for by sen-
sory, attentional, and representational interpretations, 
all predicting absence of or minimal contralesionally 
directed behavior. Bisiach and co-workers proposed 
that “This phenomenon may be functionally interpreted 
as a left–right pathological anisometry of the medium 
in which within- and between-objects spatial relations 
are episodically represented. As a consequence of right 
brain damage, this medium becomes relatively more and 
more relaxed toward the contralesional and more and 
more compact toward the ipsilesional side”.49 Accord-
ingly, any object confronting that scale would shrink 
on the contralesional side and stretch out on the ipsile-
sional side, so that UN patients erroneously displace 
rightwards the subjective midpoint of line segments to 
be bisected; similarly, when asked to duplicate leftwards 
a half-segment located ipsilesionally, they will overex-
tend it leftwards in order to subjectively perceive it as 
identical to the right half-segment (Fig. 32.2).
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FIGURE 32.2 Progressive leftward relaxation of the medium 
for space representation in unilateral neglect (UN). (A) Horizontal 
extension of the left and right sides of a line segment are underesti-
mated and overestimated, respectively, leading UN patients to mis-
place rightwards the subjective middle of the segment; (B) similarly, 
they overextend a segment leftwards to double its original length.
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Implications for Cognitive Science
Data collected from UN patients have important theo-
retical implications for cognitive processes in general and 
for the understanding of the structure of mental repre-
sentation in particular. It has long been debated whether 
the structure of mental contents is symbolic (linguistic) 
or analogic. The neuropsychological evidence from UN 
strongly supports the notion of an analogue structure 
of spatial cognition, similar to the topological relation-
ship existing between external space and the surface of 
the retina and of the striate visual cortex: “… analogue 
relationships, such as those existing between perceived 
objects (and events) and the perceiving system, may also 
exist between those objects (and events) and the brain 
mechanisms capable of representing them even in their 
absence. … In the same way as lesion of part of the cal-
carine cortex gives rise to a sensory scotoma, so spatially 
circumscribed lesions of critical brain structures may 
give rise to topologically correspondent representational 
disorders”.43
Another issue connected with UN is the “destiny” 
of neglected information: is it completely lost or is it 
processed at some level? A large body of neuropsycho-
logical evidence suggests that neglected information is 
processed up to a semantic level (see “Neglect: A Model 
for Spatial Awareness”, below).
A final general remark concerns cognitive models of 
brain functions. In order to be considered fully reliable 
in their explanatory power, they need to be grounded on 
a solid neurobiological basis. This is also true for the rep-
resentational model of UN, which is still lacking its neu-
robiological counterpart. Future research should seek an 
effective explanation of the phenomena of contralesional 
misrepresentation in the changes that are likely to be 
induced by unilateral brain lesions in the receptive fields 
of neurons involved in coding spatial relationships. Uni-
lateral lesions may affect not only the metrics according 
to which spatial relations are processed in the brain, but 
also the degree to which, and the way in which, con-
tents organized within a certain area of the pathologi-
cally uneven medium reach conscious processing levels. 
The study of changes in the responsiveness of single 
space-coding neurons following selective brain lesions 
may, therefore, shed light on the links between space 
representation and consciousness.
CONSCIOUS AWARENESS
Understanding the relationship between neural 
activity and subjective conscious experience is one of 
the most fascinating and challenging goals of modern 
neuroscience. In this section, this topic will be explored, 
starting from neuropsychological disorders in which dif-
ferent aspects of conscious awareness can be selectively 
impaired. In particular, the text will focus on three syn-
dromes, namely blindsight, neglect, and anosognosia for 
hemiplegia (AHP), that can be used as models for the 
study of visual, spatial, and motor awareness, respec-
tively. Finally, a modular model of conscious awareness 
will be proposed.
Blindsight: A Model for Visual Awareness
Awareness of a stimulus is usually defined as the sub-
jective experience of the existence of a stimulus and the 
related recognition of its physical and semantic proper-
ties. Conscious identification of a visual stimulus can be 
reported verbally or can be inferred by the observer’s 
overt behavior in response to stimulus presentation. 
Indeed, if an observer is aware of the presented stimuli, 
he or she can act upon them. A crucial issue in cognitive 
neuropsychology has been whether there is the possi-
bility of stimulus elaboration without conscious aware-
ness of it. A convincing example of this possibility is the 
blindsight syndrome.50,51 The phenomenology of blind-
sight has two principal features. The first is the loss of 
visual awareness associated with damage to the primary 
visual cortex (V1; BA 17). The second is the residual 
capacity of blind patients to use visual signals to guide 
behavioral responses. Pöppel and colleagues’ pioneer-
ing study showed that these patients, when requested 
to look at the “unseen” targets, are able to direct their 
eyes towards these stimuli.52 Weiskrantz and colleagues 
further investigated this phenomenon, showing that 
blindsight patients, although completely unaware of the 
presence of a visual stimulus in the blind field, are never-
theless able to point to it correctly and “guess” its orien-
tation.50 Since then, many studies have been conducted 
in many different laboratories around the world, which 
demonstrated residual processing of different attributes 
of the unseen stimuli by blindsight patients. For instance, 
Tamietto and de Gelder explored emotion detection in 
blindsight.53 They demonstrated that patients could cor-
rectly guess the emotion expressed by faces presented 
in their blind field. Therefore, blindsight studies have 
shown that many stimulus attributes can be processed 
in the absence of conscious vision.
One possible explanation of this paradoxical phenom-
enon is that even though a large part of the visual cortex 
is damaged, tiny islands of healthy tissue are spared. The 
visual processing carried out in this spared tissue is not 
enough to provide conscious perception, but neverthe-
less is sufficient to sustain blindsight. In this view, con-
scious awareness would be a matter of threshold; that 
is, when, after damage to the brain, the cortical activity 
is too low and does not reach a sufficient level for con-
scious activation of sensory input, visual awareness is 
lost. However, at least in some patients, it has been dem-
onstrated that when no residual island of healthy tissue 
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remains, as in surgical resection of V1 or in hemispher-
ectomy, blindsight can still be present.54 An alternative 
hypothesis is that V1 activity has a direct role in generat-
ing visual awareness. If so, consciousness would not be a 
matter of threshold but would depend on the integrity of 
a specific brain circuit, while the possibility of blindsight 
would depend on the integrity of a different circuit. In 
this respect it is important to refer to the complex neu-
roanatomy of vision. First of all, it must be kept in mind 
that visual information uses many different pathways 
from the retina to the brain. The primary visual pathway 
projects from the retina to V1, in the occipital lobe, via 
an intermediate station in the lateral geniculate nucleus 
of the thalamus. From V1, visual information reaches 
the extrastriate cortex along the ventral (occipitotempo-
ral) and the dorsal (occipitoparietal) stream. However, a 
minority of fibers originating from the retina takes a sec-
ondary route to the superior colliculus and the pulvinar. 
These two subcortical structures are interconnected and 
also send direct projections to the extrastriate visual cor-
tex, bypassing V1. Considering these anatomical char-
acteristics of the visual pathways, one possibility is that 
V1 is necessary for conscious recognition of visual stim-
uli. If it is damaged, visual consciousness is prevented. 
However, the integrity of alternative pathways, such as 
the retinal–collicular–extrastriate cortex pathway, can 
allow some visual processing without awareness, as in 
blindsight patients. Many studies have demonstrated 
the importance of the collicular nucleus for unconscious 
vision. Other studies have shown that V1 is necessary, 
but not sufficient, for full visual awareness. Indeed, 
other brain regions must be activated (such as prefrontal 
area 46) to gain full consciousness of visually presented 
stimuli.
Neglect: A Model for Spatial Awareness
A disorder that has shed light on spatial awareness 
is the neglect syndrome. Patients with unilateral spatial 
neglect, in contrast to blindsight patients, may not have 
any primary visual impairment. Nonetheless, they fail 
to respond to stimuli, objects, and even people located 
on their contralesional side, usually the left hemispace 
(see “Disorders of Spatial Representation: Unilateral 
Neglect”, above).
Despite patients’ behavior suggesting the oppo-
site, it is possible to show that the neglected stimuli 
can in some cases be fully processed. Marshall and 
Halligan reported a case of a woman with a severe visual 
neglect who explicitly denied any difference between 
the drawing of an intact house and that of a burning 
house when the features relevant to the discrimination 
were on the neglected side.55 However, when forced to 
choose the house she would prefer to live in she con-
sistently indicated the non-burning one, showing an 
implicit knowledge of the information she was unable 
to consciously report. Further studies showed that the 
patient’s choice was actually based on high-level visual 
processing. In Berti and Rizzolatti’s study, patients were 
required to respond as rapidly as possible to target stim-
uli (pictures of animals or vegetables) presented to the 
normal field by pressing one of two keys according to 
the category of the targets.56 The influence of priming 
stimuli, pictures of animals or vegetables, presented to 
the neglected field on target reaction times was studied. 
By combining different pairs of primes and targets, three 
different experimental conditions were obtained. In the 
first condition, “highly congruent”, the target and the 
prime stimuli belonged to the same category and were 
physically identical; in the second condition, “congruent”, 
the stimuli represented two elements of the same cat-
egory but were physically dissimilar; in the third con-
dition, “non-congruent”, the stimuli represented one 
exemplar from each of the two categories of stimuli. 
The results showed that the responses were facilitated 
not only in the highly congruent condition, but also in 
the congruent condition, suggesting that patients with 
neglect are able to process stimuli presented to the 
neglected field up to a categorical level of representation 
even when they deny the presence of the stimulus in the 
neglected field.
The dual visual streams discussed above may be 
used to explain non-conscious perception in neglect 
patients. As already mentioned, visual information 
from V1 reaches the extrastriate cortex along the ven-
tral (occipitotemporal) and the dorsal (occipitopari-
etal) stream. The ventral stream (also known as the 
“what pathway”) travels to the temporal lobe and is 
involved with object identification and recognition. 
The dorsal stream (“where pathway”) terminates 
in the parietal lobe and is involved with processing 
the object’s spatial location relevant to the viewer.57 
Because the neglect syndrome is usually associated 
with parietal lesions, which spare occipitotemporal 
areas, the demonstration that neglect patients can 
process visual shapes presented to the neglected side 
(up to a semantic processing level), although counterin-
tuitive psychologically, is not very surprising. Indeed, 
the capacity of shape analysis and categorization 
shown by neglect patients is exactly what one would 
expect from the functional–anatomical properties of 
the intact ventral (occipitotemporal) visual pathway. 
The really surprising aspect of Berti and Rizzolatti’s 
findings is that, despite the presence of semantic 
elaboration, patients appeared unaware of the stimuli 
presented in the affected hemispace.56 The authors 
proposed that the encoding of space is a necessary pre-
requisite for conscious perception. If spatial encoding 
is prevented or impaired, as it is in neglect, the pres-
ence of the stimulus does not reach the conscious level.
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Anosognosia for Hemiplegia: A Model for Motor 
Awareness
Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) is a clinical con-
dition in which movement awareness is dramatically 
altered. The phenomenon was named anosognosia 
(from the Greek for “lack of knowledge for the illness”) 
in 1914, by the French neurologist Joseph Babinski.58 
AHP is usually observed in patients with right-brain 
damage, who obstinately deny that there is something 
wrong with their contralesional limbs, despite the pres-
ence of severe left paralysis (for a review see Pia et al.59). 
If asked to produce an action with the paralyzed limb, 
some patients appear convinced that they are actually 
performing it, even though sensory and visual evidence 
from the affected motionless side should indicate that no 
movement has been performed.
Several authors have proposed that AHP may be 
conceptualized as a selective disorder of motor cog-
nition,60–62 on the basis of computational models of 
motor production and motor control63–65 (Fig. 32.3). 
These models posit that, in the presence of a normal 
intentional attitude, once the appropriate motor com-
mands have been selected and sent to the muscles for 
the execution of the desired movement, a prediction of 
the sensory consequences of the movement is formed 
and will be successively compared with the feedback 
associated with the actual execution of the intended 
movement. According to Blakemore and colleagues,64 
this prediction, based on the efference copy of the 
programmed motor act, constitutes the signal upon 
which motor awareness is constructed. A first con-
sequence of the above-mentioned hypothesis is that 
if consciousness of a motor act precedes the sensory 
feedbacks related to a specific movement,67 than one 
should expect to observe motor awareness for a cer-
tain movement even in the absence of any observable 
motor event.
This is exactly what happens in hemiplegic patients 
affected by AHP, who seem to be a perfect model to 
verify the relationship between motor awareness and 
motor intention. It has been proposed that the denial 
behavior in AHP patients may be due to direct dam-
age to the comparator system, localized in the premotor 
(BA 6) and insular area.62,68 This may impair the motor 
monitoring process, preventing patients from distin-
guishing between movement and no-movement states. 
However, the evident feeling of movement that AHP 
patients (erroneously) report experiencing may arise 
from intact motor intentionality, due to normal activ-
ity in other areas (mostly involving the parietofrontal 
circuit) that implement intention-programming related 
processing, which are usually spared in AHP patients.62 
Therefore, although AHP patients may not be able to 
monitor the mismatch between motor prediction and 
actual execution, because of damage to the compara-
tor, they may still be able to program movements and 
form predictions, with the consequence of construct-
ing an illusory, but neurologically grounded, motor 
awareness.
This hypothesis has been confirmed by studies69,70 
showing that the subjective experience of movement 
reported by AHP patients has objective consequences 
on their motor behavior. Using bimanual motor tasks, 
in which AHP patients were asked to simultaneously 
perform movements with both hands, the authors 
found that the movements of the intact hand were influ-
enced by the intended but not the executed movements 
of the paralyzed hand. This “influence” produces both 
spatial69 and temporal70 coupling effects, comparable 
to those found in healthy subjects actually performing 
bimanual tasks. These findings in AHP patients clearly 
show that motor awareness can be constructed even in 
the absence of movement execution, solely on the basis 
of normal intentional processes.
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FIGURE 32.3 Anosognosia for hemiplegia. 
Modified version of the feed-forward model of 
action generation.65,66
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A Modular Model for Conscious Awareness
The subjective experience that people have of them-
selves is reported to be, in normal conditions, a feeling 
of unity. The “illusion” of unity of the self, assumed by 
common-sense theories of consciousness, is evident 
in the normal experience of correspondence between 
the actual presence or absence of a stimulus and the 
presence or absence of a subjective experience of it. 
An alternative view would suggest that conscious-
ness and self-consciousness do not have a unitary, 
monolithic structure, but instead have a composite 
nature, subserved by the activity of different brain 
mechanisms distributed in specialized brain areas. 
Such a view would predict that focal brain damage 
should not cause a generalized impairment of con-
scious experience or conscious self-monitoring, but 
should instead result in domain-specific disorders 
of awareness.66 The discovery of selective disorders 
of conscious awareness (such as blindsight, neglect, 
and AHP) has provided evidence for a composite 
nature of conscious processes, as opposed to a uni-
tary one. Although the construction of fully conscious 
states may need the co-occurrence of activity in dif-
ferent parts of the brain, initial modular activation in 
dedicated brain structures seems to be necessary for 
domain-specific awareness.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Throughout this chapter the authors have raised 
some of the many questions that remain to be answered 
as researchers drive to achieve a more complete under-
standing of the multitude of disorders of higher corti-
cal function. To do so will require the combined effort of 
individuals with expertise in histology, electrophysiol-
ogy, imaging, and behavioral analysis working both in 
animal models and in clinical populations. The hope is 
that some of the readers of this chapter will take up this 
critical challenge.
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Abstract
A brief overview of the most important cognitive alterations a consequence of focal brain damage is presented. The discipline that studies 
the relationship between brain damage and higher cognitive functions is called neuropsychology and is mainly based on correlations 
between anatomy and function. Leaving aside the importance of the clinical impact that neuropsychology has on patients' treatment, its 
main experimental aim is to draw inferences from the pathological conditions to normal functions, on the assumption that if the lesion to 
a particular brain area or circuit has provoked a specific deficit, then that part of the brain is involved in or is necessary for sustaining the 
normal function. The main classical neuropsychological syndromes related to perceptual, spatial, linguistic, motor, and memory domain 
will be discussed, with a final part on syndromes in which conscious awareness is specifically altered.
Keywords: agnosia; amnesia; anosognosia for hemiplegia; aphasia; apraxia; blindsight; conscious awareness; embodied semantic; 
motor control; neglect.
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